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ABSTRACT: Since the 2010s, bottom-up anti-corruption mobilizations have broken out in different coun-
tries of south-eastern Europe. Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2014 and Macedonia in 2015 and 2016 were 
amongst the states in democratic and economic transition in which thousands of people took to the 
streets to express their discontent against a ruling class blamed for corruption. Although triggered by dif-
ferent events, these mobilizations present a number of similarities. Building on qualitative interviews and 
ethnographic observation of interactions on social media platforms, this article investigates the discursive 
strategies that movement organizers used to frame their claims and the protestors’ identity in both coun-
tries. The article explores the ways in which protest leaders in the two countries appropriated the topic of 
corruption “from below” to delegitimize the ruling class using similar motivational, identity and diagnostic 
frames, notwithstanding the protests being spurred by diverse events. Furthermore, it elucidates the simi-
larities and differences among the prognostic frames, that is, the proposed solutions to the problem of 
political corruption. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The past decade has seen corruption, clientelism and political accountability become 
topics of public concern in several countries of south-eastern Europe. Conversely, the 
level of satisfaction with and trust of citizens in the key organizations of representative 
democracy such as parliaments and political parties has been reported to have de-
clined over time (Transparency International 2017). The tension between increasing 
citizens’ concern about transparency and accountability of institutions and decreasing 
satisfaction with the political establishment is more and more frequently expressed in 
the public space by means of contentious actions. Challenging the view of a weak, pas-
sive citizenry detached from political debates and civic arenas (Howard 2003, Tarrow 
and Petrova 2006), citizens of almost every country in the Balkan area have taken part 
in grassroots protests in which an anti-corruption discourse was used against the ruling 
elite. People poured into the streets, for example, in Sofia (2013-14), Sarajevo (2014), 
Skopje (2014-16) and Bucharest (2017) to voice their outrage towards a political elite 
perceived to be held unaccountable (see also Pleyers and Sava 2015). On the streets 
and social media platforms alike, demonstrators have denounced the apparent corrup-
tion of political officials, reclaimed responsive governments, and demanded that the 
ruling class respect the rule of law.  
Corruption became thus both a prominent subject in the political discourse and a 
hot topic on the social mobilization agenda, in line with earlier research pointing to the 
centrality of corruption in public criticism in the region (Krastev 2002). Some scholars 
have attributed the increased salience of the topic to its appropriation by populist par-
ties and leaders (Brentin and Pavasović Trošt 2016). Specifically, they have argued that 
populist leaders in the region increasingly tapped into widespread societal discontent 
by strategically combining the issue of corruption with the rise in social inequality and 
the economic decline in an attempt to increase their popularity. However, little has 
been said to date about the way corruption is perceived and articulated by citizens 
themselves. Leaving aside the issue of how corruption has been appropriated “from 
above”, this article adopts a perspective “from below” in view of analysing compara-
tively the distinct ways in which movement organisers in the region have employed the 
topic of corruption as a discursive strategy to interpret and voice people’s discontent 
towards the ruling class, and to signal the crisis of legitimacy concerning the political 
elite. 
The article draws on a set of qualitative data gathered in the period 2014-2016, in-
cluding qualitative interviews and ethnographic observation of interactions on social 
media platforms, to illustrate how the anti-corruption discourse has variably been em-
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ployed by movement actors during the respective protests over corruption in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH) (2014) and Macedonia1 (2015-2016). The countries were selected for 
presenting numerous similarities in the institutional asset and socio-political context, 
allowing for what has been termed the most-similar research design, where cases are 
“as similar as possible in all respects except the outcome of interest, where they are 
expected to vary” (Gerring 2001, 210). 
The contribution of this article is twofold. First, by offering new insights into how is-
sues like corruption can be used to activate social discontent in countries usually 
deemed lacking a robust contentious political culture, it adds to the social movement 
scholarship analysing the evolution of movements vis-à-vis the crisis of neoliberalism. 
Second, this article sheds light on an under-researched geographical area of study, 
namely south-eastern Europe, which so far has shown up on the radar of academia al-
most exclusively for its ethnic conflicts and peace-building process (Belloni 2001, 2008, 
Belloni and Hemmer 2010, Kelleher and Ryan 2012), analysed with the lenses of post-
socialist transition (Linz and Stepan 1996) or with the purpose of investigating the im-
pact of the European integration on domestic politics (Kostovicova and Bojicic-
Dzelilovic 2006, Fagan 2011, Elbasani 2013). Rather than considering protest events in 
the region as isolated instances of public discontent or as novel populist movements, 
the article takes them as discrete events presenting comparable characteristics to oth-
er movements that have emerged all over Europe following the introduction of austeri-
ty measures and the advent of the economic and democratic crisis. In so doing, this ar-
ticle contributes to the recent scholarship investigating the evolution of protest and 
social mobilization in the context of a crisis of neoliberalism at a time of austerity (della 
Porta and Mattoni 2014, della Porta 2015).  
More specifically, the article argues that, seen from the perspective of social move-
ment studies, these mass protests are, on the one hand, an integral part of the upsurge 
of resistance to neoliberal transformations emerging at the global level, and on the 
other, manifestations of prevailing disillusionment concerning a long-awaited shift of 
the post-Yugoslav area from socialism to the market economy and liberal democracy. 
Such an internationally endorsed transition has, in fact, failed to deliver, and, in the 
view of some scholars, “in the end proved to be overly optimistic and misleading” 
(Bieber and Kmezić 2017, 5). The transition process has instead brought about a per-
 
1 Owing to the dispute with Greece concerning the country’s name, the EU officially addresses the 
country with the appellation “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) instead of with the coun-
try’s constitutional name, the “Republic of Macedonia”. For the sake of brevity, throughout the article I 
will use the term “Macedonia”. 
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ceived pauperisation of the population, increasing social inequalities and diffused eco-
nomic deprivation (see, for instance, Pugh 2005, Horvat and Štiks 2015).  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical background 
of the study, followed by an illustration of the methodology employed for data collec-
tion and data analysis. Section 3 provides details on the historical, social and political 
context of the countries in which the protests took place. Section 4 turns to analyse the 
case study of the anti-corruption mobilizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, section 5 deals 
with similar protests in Macedonia, with section 6 providing a comparison of the two 
case studies. Section 7 concludes by summarizing the most important findings and re-
flecting upon the emergence of popular mobilization in countries often considered to 
have a weak tradition of street activism. 
 
 
2. Theoretical and methodological background 
 
This article tackles the way in which movement organizers appropriated the topic of 
corruption to signal the crisis of legitimacy regarding the political elite in south-eastern 
Europe. To that end, the analysis centers on the process of the attribution of meaning 
that groups and individuals give to symbols, events and discourses (Goffman 1986), 
known in social movement studies as “framing activity”. According to Tarrow, much 
movement effort is cognitive and evaluative, concerned with “identifying grievances 
and translating them into claims against significant others” (Tarrow 2011, 153). It fol-
lows that frames are “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1974, 21) that movements 
construct and use to make sense of the reality in a way that prompts people to take ac-
tion, persuading bystanders of the importance and righteousness of the cause (Benford 
and Snow 2000). Following the classical categorization elaborated by Snow and Ben-
ford (1988), I center my attention on three dimensions of framing: diagnostic, prognos-
tic and motivational, without disregarding the identity frame. While diagnostic frames 
identify a social problem the movement seeks to address and assign blame to the ac-
tors who are considered responsible for it, prognostic frames evoke and suggest ap-
propriate tactics as potential solutions (Snow and Benford 1988). Differently, motiva-
tional frames provide the rationale that encourages potential supporters to side with 
challengers and to take action. Finally, identity frames “distinguish bystanders from 
opponents” (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 292), the “us” vs. “them”, a categorization used 
by movement organizers to “define their enemies by their real or imagined attributed 
and evils” (Tarrow 2011, 31). By exploring the different types of frames, this article 
identifies and compares the social problem the movement addressed and the individu-
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als acknowledged as responsible for it (diagnostic framing); the potential solutions sug-
gested (prognostic framing); the core values and motivation put forward to persuade 
individuals to get involved in the protests (motivational framing), and the way in which 
discursive strategies created a shared sense of belonging (identity frame).  
Data for this article have been collected by means of qualitative methods such as 
document analysis and in-depth interviews with activists and key informants. The bulk 
of data collection occurred in two phases. In 2014, I conducted fieldwork in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, while the interviews in Macedonia date to 2016. Specifically, I conducted 
a dozen semi-structured in-depth interviews with movement organizers of the 2014 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian protests and five in-depth interviews with activists who took 
part in the 2015-16 mobilizations in Macedonia. I also closely examined websites and 
social media materials such as press releases, communiqués, flyers, slogans, move-
ments’ manifestos and documents, as well as media statements, published on the Bos-
nian-Herzegovinian Facebook pages of citizens’ participatory assemblies (known as 
“plenums”) that emerged in 2014 in the main cities of the country, i.e. the plenum of 
Sarajevo (@PlenumSa) and the plenum of Tuzla (@PlenumTK), and the articles pub-
lished on the blog “Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files” 
(https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com), which collected and translated into English the 
texts produced by the plenums during the February-May 2014 wave of protest. As re-
gards the Macedonian case, I analyzed the same type of material published on the 
Macedonian “Protestiram” website (http://protestiram.info/) and Facebook page 
(@protestiramezaedno), as well as the Facebook page of the platform “Citizens of 
Macedonia” (@gragjanite.mk), and Colorful Revolution (@ColorfulMacedonia). 
Throughout the data collection phase, I devoted attention to photographs and memes, 
as both waves of mobilization presented widespread use of visual material. Documents 
and transcripts were examined by introducing elements of discourse analysis, adopted 
for its ability to uncover “how movement ‘texts’ (…) are composed and draw on exist-
ing discourses in order to communicate particular meanings” (Lindekilde 2014, 198). 
 
 
3. Historical, social and political background 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia have been chosen for comparison as they 
present several similarities. Multi-ethnic cohabitation was at its highest in these 
countries before the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992 (Hodson, Sekulic, and Massey 
1994); both states experienced violent conflicts that featured ethnic elements (Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1992-95 and Macedonia in 2001) and had peacekeeping forces from the 
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United Nations (UN) and other international actors deployed in their territory right 
after the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s2. In both cases, internationally sponsored peace 
agreements (for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace Accords3 signed in 1995 and for 
Macedonia the Ohrid Agreement4 of 2001) terminated the conflict, which was followed 
by a process of stabilisation and democratization. Nowadays, three different ethno-
national groups coexist in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serbs (of Orthodox faith), Croats 
(Catholic) and Bosniaks (of Muslim religion). Similarly, in Macedonia, the Macedonian-
Orthodox segment of population is dominant, living side by side with the Albanian-
Muslim community. While in BiH the three national groups share a language, in 
Macedonia the two communities speak different languages (Macedonian and 
Albanian). Although the peace agreements aimed at protecting the equal rights of the 
three constituents people living in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at providing more rights for 
the Albanian minority in Macedonia, both countries are still characterized by tensions 
of an ethno-national nature. The constitutional set-up of the two states grants 
proportional representation to the peoples living in their territory, which coexist under 
a political system operating on a consociational basis (Bieber 2005). According to the 
latest population census, in Macedonia Macedonians constitute almost 65% of the 
population (1,297,981 individuals), while 25% of citizens identify themselves as 
Albanian (509,083 people) (Republic of Macedonia, State statistical office 2005). The 
data of the census conducted in 2013 in Bosnia-Herzegovina (the latest after the 1992-
95 conflict) reports that 50% of the population identify as belonging to the Bosniak 
group, about 30% as members of the Serbian community, and around 15% as part of 
the Croatian one. The remaining part did not answer or chose not to declare its ethno-
national affiliation (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016).  
Among other similarities, both countries have faced democratic turmoil in recent 
years (Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2014 and Macedonia in 2015 and 2016). On several 
occasions, citizens of both countries have expressed open dissent about corruption 
towards their political establishment by means of street protests. In Bosnia-
 
2 The UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (1992-95); UN Preventive Deployment 
Force in Macedonia (1995-99). 
3 The Dayton Peace Accords, named for the place in the US state of Ohio in which the agreement was 
signed, put the 1992-95 conflict to a halt, setting up BiH as a consociational democracy and a triple power-
sharing system in which the three constituent nations (i.e. Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) are granted propor-
tional representation through a system of ethnic quotas. 
4  The 2001 Peace Accord, signed in the Macedonian city of Ohrid, ended a seven-month armed conflict 
between Albanian militants and the Macedonian security forces, which left more than 100 people dead. 
Amongst other provisions, the deal accommodated more rights to the Albanian ethnic minority. 
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Herzegovina and in Macedonia, demonstrators targeted government buildings and 
other symbols of power, at times violently, at other times making use of a creative 
repertoire. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, protestors vandalized and set fire to several 
governmental edifices in 2014; in Macedonia they occupied the public space in front of 
the Parliament building in 2015, and threw paint-filled balloons into the main 
government offices and monuments in 2016. In all these circumstances, demonstrators 
resorted to the use of a discourse tackling the corruption of policy makers in order to 
gain the broader support of various social groups, pointing to the whole political elite 
as the main culprit for the unfulfilled promises of freedom, equality, and citizens’ 
participation in political processes. On the streets, citizens of both former Yugoslav 
states demanded accountability on the part of the ruling elite, a government 
responsive to people’s needs and problems, that public authorities and officials abide 
by the law and respect democracy, as well as the adoption of anti-corruption 
provisions. Moreover, the slogans and banners carried on the streets by the citizens of 
both countries were written in a language that denounced political corruption. For 
instance, they referred to their politicians as “thieves and criminals” (MC2), pointing to 
an elite perceived as unaccountable, robbing from their constituencies (BH1), and 
“having increasing authoritarian tendencies” (MC2).  
Although long present in the public discourse, the issue of corruption has increased 
in salience in both countries over the recent years, following a heightened sensitivity of 
public opinion towards the topic, as recently published reports show. In 2017, the Cor-
ruption Perception Index published by the anti-corruption organization Transparency 
International, which aims at measuring the perceived level of corruption in the public 
sector worldwide, reports high rates of perceived large-scale corruption in public insti-
tutions of south-eastern Europe. The report disclosed that the citizens of the two Yugo-
slav successor states experience corruption as a strong, continuous presence in their 
social environment. Asked to score how corrupt their country’s public sectors are seen 
to be on a scale ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), the citizens at-
tributed a score that falls below the midpoint of the scale (Transparency International 
2017). Furthermore, with respect to worldwide ranking, the two countries placed 
themselves among the lower-ranked countries in terms of perceived transparency of 
institutions.  
The data for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia unveil an increase over time in the 
perception of highly corrupt public institutions and low standards of the rule of law, 
with little improvement in citizens’ trust in state institutions. The figures of the report 
clearly demonstrate citizens’ deepened scepticism towards the institutions of repre-
sentative democracy (e.g., Parliament and political parties) in contrast with a height-
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ened trust in executive institutions and judicial bodies. A research conducted in 2015 
by the Sarajevo-based think-tank Analitika shows the extent to which the level of citi-
zens’ trust in the institutions of representative democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
progressively declining. Conversely, trust in religious institutions is top-ranking (Analiti-
ka - Center for Social Research 2015). While almost 60% of Bosnian-Herzegovinian citi-
zens declare that they have “high” or “some” trust in religious institutions, only 20% of 
the population expresses the same degree of belief in political parties. Amongst the in-
stitutions upon which citizens rely most are the Office of the High Representative5 
(OHR) (41%) and the European Commission (40%). Entity6 and state parliaments, as 
well as governments at the local level, report the lowest scores in the rank.  
The trust of Macedonian citizens in institutions of representative democracy docu-
ments a similar trend. According to a survey conducted by the Center for Insights in 
Survey Research, a significant proportion of Macedonian citizens expressed full trust in 
the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO)7 (39%), an extra-judicial institution in charge of 
investigating allegations of high-level crime since 2015, whereas only 15% declared 
that it relies on the state commission for preventing corruption. More than 50% of the 
surveyed population considers the work of the SPO important in ensuring the rule of 
law in Macedonia. A mere 16% of respondents claimed to believe in trustworthiness of 
political parties, while the highest trust was expressed towards the educational system 
(42%). The same survey discloses that almost 57% of the Macedonian population disa-
grees with the statement “the rule of law exists in Macedonia”8 (Center for Insights in 
Survey Research 2017). 
 
  
 
5 The High Representative (HR) is an international civilian supervisor in charge of enforcing the civilian 
implementation of the Dayton agreement. He is the highest authority in the country, accountable to the 
Peace Implementation Council (PIC) international body. Among his tasks, the HR is entitled to remove 
elected or appointed officials from office if they violate the commitments envisaged in the Dayton Agree-
ment. 
6 Entities in BiH are semi-autonomous territorial units that make up the country. There are two such 
units: Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH). 
7 The SPO in Macedonia was established as part of the European Union and United States-brokered 
Przhino Agreement. 
8 Rule of law was defined in the survey as “a state where all people and institutions are accountable to 
the law and the Constitution, and the Constitution and the law are equally applied to all”.  
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4. The protest over corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
Historically, Bosnia-Herzegovina does not bear a solid tradition of mobilization and 
collective action transcending ethno-national cleavages (Milan 2016). Mass street pro-
tests were not a common occurrence before the 2010s, when the expression of opposi-
tion through confrontational means of action began to emerge in the country. In 2013, 
demonstrations were organized to protest the lack of a nationwide law on ID cards 
(Mujkić 2015). On that occasion, protest marches took place in the capital and in some 
urban centers of the country, generated by the inability of a critically ill infant to seek 
medical care abroad due to the lack of personal documents, which could not be issued 
owing to a political stalemate. The sit-ins in front of the National Parliament and the 
peaceful protests on the streets, organized by ordinary citizens to pressure policy mak-
ers to adopt a state law on identification numbers, terminated after a month. One year 
later, social discontent materialized in the northern part of the country. 
The 2014 protests began in February in the city Tuzla, a former industrial hub locat-
ed in the northeastern part of the country. The political turmoil, which from Tuzla 
spread to the main urban centers and towns of BiH within a couple of days, was 
dubbed the “Social Uprising,” as the mobilization took the form of a widespread and at 
times violent rebellion. The protest that triggered the discontent was initiated by dis-
enfranchised workers of recently privatized factories of the Tuzla area in response to 
the closure of their plants (Murtagh 2016). The laid-off workers had staged several 
demonstrations in the past as a way to urge the reopening of the factories that once 
employed them, as well as to demand the payment of the wage arrears and unpaid 
benefits the workers were entitled to (Milan 2016). The closure of the factories 
stemmed from the privatization process that, from the 1990s onwards, had transferred 
the ownership of the state-owned assets to private entrepreneurs. The massive layoffs 
were thus the consequence of the mishandled privatization and mismanagement of 
the new owners, who in several cases took advantage of funds intended to withdraw 
the state from the economy, in cahoots with the local political elite (Pugh 2005). 
On February 5th, the victims of these layoffs, the local trade unions and the unem-
ployed, called for a protest rally. As had happened often in the past, the demonstrators 
gathered in front of the Tuzla canton’s court9, being the local government and judiciary 
the bodies in charge of following the lawsuits brought by the workers against the own-
ers of their companies. Unlike previous times, on February 5th, police forces violently 
 
9 Cantons are administrative and largely autonomous units that compose the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (FBiH), one of the two regional entities of the state. As local levels of government, each can-
ton is responsible for issues such as civil administration, education, police, environment, and so on.  
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repelled the workers when they attempted to forcibly break into the premises of the 
canton government. The police reaction sparked a violent response, and the rally spi-
raled out of control. Two more days of unrest followed. The February 5th demonstra-
tion in Tuzla acted as a catalyst for mobilization, the repression of the protest setting 
into motion an unprecedented wave of solidarity across the country. In the city of Tu-
zla, students and other sectors of the population took to the streets in support of the 
workers. From the former industrial hub, the demonstrations diffused to several towns 
and urban centers of the country, joined by people of all ages. In an escalation of vio-
lence, on 7 February town halls, cantons’ buildings and the headquarters of the nation-
alist parties were set ablaze and wrecked by demonstrators in the main cities of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. The violent riots faded around 10 February. 
The popular upheaval led to a sequence of high-level resignations of policy officials 
and was followed by a series of more conventional street marches that lasted until May 
2014. Besides street demonstrations, joined by people from all walks of life and differ-
ent national groups, citizens organized assemblies open to public participation, called 
“plenums”. As an action form, the plenums functioned according to a direct democratic 
method of decision-making. Voicing their skepticism about the party system, the as-
sembly participants sought alternative methods of political articulation based on a hor-
izontal organizational structure (Milan 2017). Soon, the plenum model spread 
throughout the country, bringing together different strands of opposition movements 
and social groups. In the plenary sessions, retirees, workers, the unemployed, young 
activists and professionals articulated a broad array of concrete demands, which were 
collected and at a later stage re-elaborated in dedicated working groups, before being 
handed on to the authorities in charge of the specific issue (Arsenijević 2014, BH3).  
Paralleling the increasing number of demonstrators and participants in citizen as-
semblies, the issues at stake and the demands broadened. The participants lamented 
the high level of unemployment in the country, lack of accountability and transparency 
of the authorities towards their constituencies and the culture of impunity prevailing 
among politicians, framing the issue in terms of good governance and social justice 
(BH1, BH2). In particular, the demonstrators blamed the political class for holding on to 
power by means of corrupt practices that relied upon the maintenance of clientelistic 
networks and the perpetuation of ethnic divisions. After months of protests and street 
marches, plenum activity came to a final halt around mid-May 2014.  
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5. The anti-corruption protests in Macedonia 
 
Between 2014 and 2016, Macedonia witnessed an upsurge of social protest that 
represented the peak of a political crisis that began in 2012 and deepened in 2015. 
During the three years of unrest, the citizens of Macedonia used street demonstrations 
to denounce the lack of accountability of the ruling elite and to demand a radical shift 
in the political and social agenda (Vankovska 2015). The Macedonian season of civic 
discontent can be split into three phases. The first of these saw the emergence of a 
student movement in October 2014, which attracted a large number of people protest-
ing the government’s attempts to reform the educational system (Štiks 2015)10. The 
demonstrations resulted in the creation of the Student Plenum, an informal group 
whose participants occupied the faculties in protest, declaring them “free autonomous 
zones”. There, they held alternative public lectures in collaboration with supportive 
professors who, meanwhile, had organized into the Professors’ Plenum.  
The second phase was marked by a major political crisis provoked by the disclosure 
of a massive wire-tapping operation by the incumbent government. In early 2015, 
Zoran Zaev, the leader of the Social-Democrat opposition party, the Social Democratic 
Union of Macedonia (SDSM)11, announced the release of what he called “the first of 
several political bombs” (Balkan Insight 2015). In practice, Zaev publicly unveiled that 
the incumbent Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, leader of the ruling conservative-
nationalist party VMRO-DPMNE12 and premier since 2006, had allowed the national se-
curity services to wiretap the telephone conversations of around 20,000 Macedonian 
citizens, among them officials, journalists and political adversaries (EPRS 2016). Besides 
unleashing the wiretapping scandal, Zaev provided incriminating evidence that the 
government had concealed the responsibilities of a police officer in a murder 
(Deutsche Welle 2017). As a consequence of this revelation, Gruevski’s cabinet was ac-
cused of corruption, illegal influence on the judiciary, pressuring the media, and elec-
toral violations, while Zaev was indicted for violence against state officials and charged 
with various crimes, including espionage (Petrovski 2016).  
 
10 Among other provisions, the reforms foresaw the substitution of the final university examination 
with a test to assess the students’ knowledge by an external body, chosen by the Ministry of Education – 
an act likely to inhibit the autonomy of public universities (Pollozhani 2016). 
11 In Macedonian: Социјалдемократски сојуз на Македонија. 
12 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity. 
In Macedonian: Внатрешна македонска револуционерна организација – Демократска партија за 
македонско национално единство. 
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The release of the “political bomb” gave rise to a surge of discontent among the lo-
cal population towards the political class. Following popular mobilisation, the clashes in 
the northern town of Kumanovo in May 201513 and international diplomatic pressure, 
the ministers of the Interior and of Transport and Communications resigned, as did the 
chief of the Secret Services. For his part, Prime Minister Gruevski refused to step down. 
Ordinary citizens reacted to his refusal to resign by taking to the streets in the thou-
sands, organized by means of social networks in the “Citizens for Macedonia”, a plat-
form that gathered together “more than 70 non-governmental organizations, over 15 
political parties (including the oppositional SDSM) and thousands of unaffiliated citi-
zens” (Stefanovski 2016, 401). On the streets, demonstrators urged the premier to step 
down and to find a solution to the political impasse. Anti-government protests fol-
lowed until mid-July 2015, with rallies taking place mostly in Skopje. Although generally 
unfolding in a peaceful fashion, protests turned violent on May 5, witnessing violent 
clashes between activists and the police, as well as the arrest of some protestors. The 
violent episode of May 5 marked a turning point, following which the protesters orga-
nized another group called “I Protest for Peace and Justice”. The group became widely 
known also as “I Protest” (#Протестирам #protestiram), as the hashtag used on social 
media networks for the demonstrations, which later turned into the reference for the 
events14. “I Protest” was a wide, informal movement, made up of individuals who in-
tended to protest (MC2). 
The broad citizens’ movement articulated several demands, which ranged from the 
immediate resignation of the incumbents to the release of the demonstrators detained 
since May 5, to the call for electing a new democratic government (MC2). The social 
protest reached its peak with a mass rally in Skopje on 17 May, after which the sup-
porters of the SDSM opposition party, together with numerous social movement or-
ganizations and individuals, pitched tents in front of the Macedonian governmental 
building. The activists called the encampment “Freedom Camp” (Vankovska 2015). As a 
response, the following day VMRO-DPMNE supporters organized a counter-protest, 
mobilizing party activists and setting up a counter-encampment next to that of the op-
position. The occupation lasted two months (Stefanovski 2016). The protests came to 
an end in July 2015, after almost two months of political turmoil, and the signature of 
 
13 A controversial episode occurred in the town of Kumanovo on May 9 and 10, when a shooting among 
allegedly Albanian militants and the Macedonian police led to several deaths and 28 men arrested and 
charged with terrorism (the Guardian 2015). 
14 Both the movement and the hashtag recalled the protests against police brutality which occurred in 
Macedonia in 2011 (Al Jazeera 2011).  
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the internationally sponsored “Przhino15 Agreement” in July 2015. The political accord, 
signed by the leaders of the country’s main political parties, was brokered by the 
European Union (through the EU Delegation to Macedonia) and the United States 
(through the US Amabassador to Macedonia) to bring an end to the political and 
institutional crisis paralyzing the country. The document envisaged several measures, 
amongst which the participation of the oppositional SDSM in the ministries, the demise 
of Premier Gruevski in January 2016, early parliamentary elections, and the 
establishment of a Special Prosecutor's Office to investigate the crimes arising from the 
wiretapping scandal (European Commission 2015).  
The end to the stalemate was temporary, however, and a third wave of social unrest 
began in April 2016. Gruevski had already stepped down as prime minister in January 
2016, replaced ad interim by Emil Dimitriev (who belonged to the ruling party, namely, 
VMRO-DPMNE), and parliamentary elections were due in June 2016, when President 
Gjorge Ivanov announced his decision to halt judicial inquiries into officials at the time 
under investigation by the Special Public Prosecutor’s Office as allegedly involved in the 
wiretapping scandal. Despite the president’s claim that the mass pardon was imple-
mented in the interests of the country, both the opposition and ordinary citizens inter-
preted the act as a clear intention to protect party officials from prosecution, exacer-
bating thus the perception of the impunity of political elites (MC2). The event consti-
tuted the spark for protests to resume in a third wave that became known as “The Col-
ourful Revolution” (on the social networks with the hashtag #Шаренареволуција 
#šarenarevolucija) due to the repertoire of contention adopted by protesters. Choosing 
a novel means of expressing their dissent, the demonstrators hurled paint-filled bal-
loons at various monuments and government buildings in the centre of the capital. 
Meanwhile, protests spread across the country, and demonstrations were held in 
towns and cities all over Macedonia. The demonstrators targeted, in particular, build-
ings and monuments that symbolized the urban renovation project launched by the 
government in 2010, known as “Skopje 2014”, said to have been a source of criminal 
capital and money laundering. The “Colorful Revolution” witnessed the participation of 
citizens from various social strata, waving Macedonian and Albanian flags together 
(Deutsche Welle 2016). Alongside insisting that the president revoke the pardons and 
the cabinet to resign, the demonstrators claimed that conditions for free and transpar-
ent elections were not yet in place, and called for the cancellation the parliamentary 
 
15 Named after the neighbourhood of the capital where the negotiations took place.  
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elections planned for June 201616. Unlike the previous wave of mobilization, in this last 
phase the opposition party SDSM was not officially part of the protesters’ front, alt-
hough its members participated in the demonstrations on an individual basis (MC1). 
Given that the May elections were eventually postponed, and the presidential pardon 
had been revoked to several officials implicated in the wiretapping scandal, the turmoil 
came to a halt in June 2016. In May 2017, President Ivanov granted a mandate to form 
a new government to the opposition leader Zoran Zaev.  
 
 
6. Comparing anti-corruption frames in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 
 
The two waves of anti-corruption protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 
present similar features, in particular with respect to the tactical repertoires employed 
by the demonstrators and their social basis as well as the way in which the issue at 
stake was framed. In spite of being triggered by different events, in both mobilization 
movement organizers put forward similar discursive strategies. In what follows, I ana-
lyze the rationales provided by protest leaders to motivate potential supporters to take 
action and to distinguish bystanders from opponents. Following that, I reconstruct the 
ways in which activists in both countries converged in the assessment of the problem 
and on tracing responsibility to the ruling class and their corrupt practices. Finally, I ex-
plore the diverse solutions put forward by protest leaders.  
Activists in the two countries blamed the establishment for badly functioning public 
institutions and lack of democracy, economic deprivation, as well as the widespread 
impoverishment of the population. In both cases, the grievances of protesters con-
cerned issues of corruption. According to the interviewees in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
ruling elite was responsible for the mismanagement of the privatisation process of 
public enterprises and state-owned assets, which led to the bankruptcy of the industry 
in the country. Similarly, in Macedonia the protest leaders claimed that the revelation 
of corruption scandals in the country set into motion the cycles of protest, as it dis-
closed the lack of democracy in the country (MC1). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the blame 
was assigned in particular to nationalist profiteers and former warlords, turned political 
officials in the aftermath of the 1992-95 conflict, accused of having enriched them-
selves through illegal activities and the privatization process of state assets, which re-
 
16 Infographics available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/protestiramezaedno/photos/a.1649035648648791.1073741830.1648518838
700472/1769400383278983/?type=3&theater [accessed 14 May 2017]. 
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sulted in bankrupted factories and mass layoffs (BH3). A banner held in the streets of 
Sarajevo read: “You have robbed for twenty years, and it is enough!” (Pljačkali ste 20 
godina, i dosta je). Corruption was believed to mobilize different strands of demonstra-
tors, belonging both to the former working class and to other segments of population, 
equally affected by corrupt practices that were said to determine the allocation of jobs 
in the public administration. An interviewee explained that the clientelistic networks, 
which often regulate the allocation of work places in the country, were at the same 
time hindering the opposition to the system from below. She said:  
 
Sarajevo is the capital of the administrative center, about 20.000 people are involved 
in state service; there is a lot of corruption and nepotism. Sarajevo is the core of it all, 
and it is an illusion to expect people who got their jobs via nepotism and corruption to go 
on the streets and say: “We are against corruption”. (BH4) 
 
Nonetheless, it emerged that the fight against corruption brought together individu-
als who belonged to different ethno-national groups. A protest leader referred to cor-
ruption as a mobilizing frame in the following way: 
 
The protests were socio-economic; people wanted jobs, an end to corruption, 
nepotism, and they wanted that message to get through. If they'd asked for any-
thing else, they knew that immediately the nationalists would appropriate it and 
just destroy the original message. (BH2) 
 
In Macedonia, protest leaders pointed to the irresponsible behavior of the political 
elite as the main reason for their discontent. In particular, they accused Premier 
Gruevski of retaining his grip on power through electoral fraud and clientelistic practic-
es and of betraying citizens by illegally wiretapping them (MC1), as well as working “to 
prolong the livelihood of the corrupt regime by signing a political deal with other party 
leaders” (MC3). Similarly, in an interview published on the website of “Solidarnost”, a 
leftist group that took part in the Macedonian protests, one of the protest leaders de-
scribed the act of taking to the streets as a way to re-appropriate what the ruling elite 
had stolen from their constituencies. In her words, the mobilization represented a way 
of “reclaiming the streets, reclaiming what is ours. Reclaiming what has been plun-
dered by the corrupt ruling elite” (Солидарност 2016). Another activist expressed the 
perceived sense of betrayal and blamed the elite, pointing to their unaccountability 
and depicting the act of taking to the streets as a necessary and natural consequence 
of citizens “that had enough [of the situation]” (MC1). While commenting on the offi-
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cials indicted for illegal wiretapping and later pardoned by the president, he stressed 
the salience of corruption in mobilizing demonstrators:  
 
One [politician] is charged for electoral fraud (…), another for torturing people. And in 
spite of being accused of it, all of a sudden the president set them free. This is a big is-
sue! (….) Who wouldn’t be against that? (MC1).   
 
In both countries, movement organizers tried to convince bystanders to take to the 
streets by resorting to discursive strategies presenting collective action as a possible 
way to fight corruption, to make people’s voice heard and to gain leverage over politi-
cians. In so doing, activists adopted a dichotomizing discourse that strongly opposed 
the mass of dissatisfied citizens to the corrupt and unaccountable elites. By resorting to 
a language typical of populist style, both the establishment and the opponents were 
portrayed as belonging to all-inclusive, homogeneous categories. As opposed to the 
ruling elite, the demonstrators encompassed the inherently good population, untaint-
ed by ethnic or religious divides and betrayed by the elites in charge. To convey this 
message, activists strove to avoid attributing an ethno-national connotation to the de-
monstrators. In both the cases analyzed, ethno-national divisions were overcome in 
the narratives in the name of a “common enemy”: the corrupt establishment, immune 
to accountability. The attempt to eschew ethnic connotation was equally embraced by 
protestors, who in Bosnia-Herzegovina raised banners on the streets that made a clear 
reference to the unity among three constituent peoples. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, from 
the very beginning the collective “we” was framed in terms of the “hungry people” 
(gladan narod) united in solidarity regardless of ethno-national belonging. Hence, the 
identity frame pointed to the emergence of a new cleavage that overcame the domi-
nant ethno-national categorization by sidelining it. The unity of protestors was ex-
pressed in slogans such as “Our union is your destruction” (Naše ujedinjenje je vaše 
uništenje), which aimed at portraying ordinary citizens united regardless of ethno-
national cleavages. Similarly, a banner raised on the streets of Sarajevo read: “We are 
hungry in three languages” (Gladni smo na tri jezika), with the intention to ridicule the 
institutionalization of ethno-national categories in the country, blamed for dividing 
across ethno-national lines people who, in their daily life, face similar problems, and 
are therefore portrayed as “united in deprivation” (BH1). Similarly, in Macedonia, ban-
ners, statements and calls to take to the streets were written in both Macedonian and 
Albanian languages, as were the hashtags used on the social media platforms and on 
the calls for action sprayed on the walls of the capital (Protestiram, meaning “I pro-
test”, was written both as #Протестирам, in Macedonia, and #protestoj, in Albanian). 
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In a similar fashion, the main slogan on 17 May 2015 demonstration read: “We are 
one” (ние сме едно), indicating the unity among the two peoples of Macedonia. In 
contrast to the protesters’ front, the elites were addressed with negatively connoted 
attributes, with reference made to their impunity after allegedly robbing, and thus be-
traying, their constituencies. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, interviewees expressed a similar 
sense of betrayal. Often, they referred to the demonstrators as “transition losers” 
(BH2), signaling the disillusionment of citizens towards the transition to market econ-
omy and liberal democracy, which was expected to bring about socio-economic rights, 
freedom and democracy. Both events that produced the mass protests in the two Yu-
goslav successor states were thus described as revelatory moments in which demon-
strators realized that their expectations had not been met.  
As a potential solution to the crisis, in both cases, movement organizers opted for a 
discourse that pressed for the resignation of the incumbents (i.e. local and federal gov-
ernments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the president in Macedonia) and the appoint-
ment of new officials. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the call for government accountability 
was accompanied by a demand to appoint technical governments composed of experts 
not affiliated with political parties and to introduce elements of direct democracy as a 
corrective to the representative system founded on electoral democracy. In Macedo-
nia, during the Colorful Revolution, protesters sought the establishment of a transi-
tional government and demanded a rescinding of the decision to hold parliamentary 
elections, scheduled for 5th June 201617. In particular, during the later phase of the pro-
tests, movement organizers in Macedonia pointed to the Special Prosecutor’s Office as 
the institution in charge of upholding the rule of law. In their words, the Special Prose-
cutor, an institution set up by the EU in the framework of the Przhino Agreement, was 
depicted as the guardian of democracy and a demonstrators’ ally in the fight against 
corruption. By organizing rallies in support of the Special Prosecutor in September 
2016, the “Colorful Revolution” movement conveyed a message portraying said institu-
tion as the bearer of popular will, playing a crucial role in resolving the crisis. A state-
ment calling for a public rally in support of the SPO in September 2016 reported:  
 
The government still ruled by the indicted Gruevski uses all opportunities to block the 
work of this institution (…) The SPO needs our help again. We must not let the regime 
 
17 The Colorful Revolution statement “We determinedly continue with protests and demand:” 
https://www.facebook.com/ColorfulMacedonia/photos/a.981719635238941.1073741828.981710395239
865/981720035238901/?type=3&theater 
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think that this institution, even for a moment, is left without the strong, joint, and deci-
sive support by the citizens! As long as there's no justice, there will be no peace!  18.  
 
The distrust of the ruling elite was thus counterbalanced by a novel trust in an inde-
pendent institution perceived as capable of upholding justice and of uprooting political 
corruption in the country. By contrast, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, movement organizers 
did not explicitly point to a supportive ally outside the political system. A part of the 
movement referred to actors outside the system of representative democracy, such as 
the EU and the OHR, as potential citizens’ allies. Nevertheless, protest leaders opted 
not to identify the High Representative as an ally owing to his decreasing direct in-
volvement in domestic affairs in the last decade (BH1). On the streets, some demon-
strators called for the EU to hold their leaders accountable: for instance, a banner 
raised on the streets read, in English: “EU, we are the ones you should talk with”. Other 
activists proposed to reject the representative system in favor of an alternative model 
of direct democracy (Marković 2015).  
The anti-corruption frames put forward by movement organizers did not go uncon-
tested in the political arena. In an attempt to demobilize and delegitimize the protests, 
incumbent governments relied heavily on identity counterframes revolving around the 
threat of an external enemy fuelling the protests in order to destabilize the country. In 
the case of Macedonia, on several occasions, Premier Gruevski blamed the American 
billionaire George Soros for fueling civic unrest, labeling opponents “Soros-oids”19. 
Along these lines, both media and public officials often referred to the young demon-
strators vandalizing the cities during the February protest as “hooligans prepared to 
wreck the symbols of the state” (BH1), while the president of Republika Srpska Milorad 
Dodik congratulated the citizens of the Serb entity for not falling for provocations by 
the protests unfolding in the other entity, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in his 
view organized with the aim of destabilizing the country (Živković 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
18 “Macedonian ‘Colorful Revolution’ Rallies to Defend Special Prosecutor’s Office”, Global Voices, 26 
September 2016, https://globalvoices.org/2016/09/26/macedonian-colorful-revolution-rallies-to-defend-
special-prosecutors-office/ 
19 “After Trump Win, Anti-Soros Forces Are Emboldened in Eastern Europe”, New York Times, 1 March 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/world/europe/after-trump-win-anti-soros-forces-are-
emboldened-in-eastern-europe.html 
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7. Conclusions 
 
The discourse of corruption has become increasingly prominent in recent years in 
south-eastern Europe. Already in the 2010s, popular dissatisfaction with perceived en-
demic political corruption began to be expressed by means of collective action. At this 
time, street marches and protests became a common feature of activism in the post-
socialist context. Between 2014 and 2016, anti-corruption mobilizations took place in 
different countries of south-eastern Europe. In particular, citizens in the former Yugo-
slav states of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia participated in mass demonstrations 
to express their discontent concerning a ruling class accused of being corrupt and unre-
sponsive to its constituencies. This article offered a comparative overview of the dis-
cursive strategies adopted by movement organizers during mobilizations over corrup-
tion in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2014) and Macedonia (2015-16). Specifically, it explored 
the ways in which activists appropriated “from below” the topic of corruption to dele-
gitimize the ruling class and exploited similar motivational, identity and diagnostic 
frames, while their prognoses differed. By analysing these waves of protest in south-
eastern Europe through the lens of social movement studies, this article foregrounded 
the idea of moving beyond an analysis of movements in post-socialist semi-peripheral 
Europe as typically associated with instances of populism. Instead, it stressed the utility 
of approaching them as movements developed in times of economic and democratic 
crisis. 
 The novel empirical findings contributed to our understanding of the different 
discursive techniques adopted during the anti-corruption campaigns in the region, as 
well as of the drivers for the popular participation in and wide-ranging support for the 
protests in contexts usually thought of as having a weak contentious political culture. 
The article disclosed that the narrative identifying in the corrupt political elite the main 
culprit for economic decline and social inequality, and the people-centrist discourse re-
volving around the betrayal of ordinary citizens, resonated across social and ethno-
national groups in the population of both countries, succeeding in mobilizing a large 
number of citizens. Furthermore, the analysis revealed a coexistence of different solu-
tions to political corruption. While in Bosnia-Herzegovina activists proposed the ap-
pointment of technical governments detached from political affiliation and the intro-
duction of elements of direct democracy into the representative system, in Macedonia 
they acknowledged the Special Prosecutor’s Office as the guardian of democracy and 
rule of law, allied with the civil society in the fight against political corruption and for 
more transparent institutions. 
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 In conclusion, despite the diversity in the drivers of the mobilizations, the anal-
ysis disclosed a similar pattern of appropriation of the topic of corruption “from below” 
as a successful discursive strategy to voice society-wide discontent with the institution 
of representative democracy and towards the ruling class in south-eastern Europe, 
presenting a comparable diagnosis and different prognoses. 
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